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 1 
Summary 
In 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union became 
legally binding almost a decade after the process to draft a Charter had 
begun. Naturally, the Charter’s status as a legally binding document raises 
new questions about the future protection of human rights in Europe and the 
Charter’s relation to the European Convention on Human Rights as well as 
the Member States’ constitutional rights.  
 
The horizontal provisions of the Charter, placed in the seventh chapter, 
govern its field of application and aim at managing conflicts between the 
Charter and other sources of protection of human rights. It has, however, not 
been clear how these provisions should be interpreted and what they thereby 
might entail. During the spring of 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
finally settled two cases, Åkerberg and Melloni, concerning the 
interpretation of two of these horizontal provisions.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine the relationship between 
the protection of human rights at supranational level and at national level in 
light of recent case law and to answer the question of what the implications 
of the Charter might be for the relationship between EU law and national 
law.  
 
As is presented in this thesis, there are different ways of understanding the 
relationship between EU law and national law. One understanding is that the 
European legal order is superior to the national legal orders and that 
provisions of EU law therefore must prevail over provisions of national law 
in case of a conflict. In contrast, the concept constitutional pluralism seeks 
to understand the relationship in a non-hierarchical sense. According to the 
theories that are called discursive constitutional pluralism, EU law has 
developed through a dialogue between the ECJ and the national courts and 
an on-going dialogue between the courts is also a source of legitimacy for 
the ECJ.  
 
In Åkerberg and Melloni, the ECJ finally clarified how two of the horizontal 
provisions of the Charter should be interpreted. It is evident from the 
Court’s ruling in these two cases that the ECJ will still influence the 
protection of human rights at national level to a great extent. At the same 
time, my analysis is that it is possible to understand the ECJ’s rulings as a 
reflection of discursive constitutional pluralism and that the Court’s 
interpretations of the horizontal provisions have the potential to reconcile 
the European legal order with the national legal orders. Consequently, 
Åkerberg and Melloni further strengthens the notion that the relationship 
between EU law and national law is better understood in a non-hierarchical 
sense.  
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Sammanfattning 
År 2009 blev Europeiska Unionens stadga om de grundläggande 
rättigheterna juridiskt bindande nästan ett decennium efter det att processen 
att utarbeta en stadga hade påbörjats. Stadgans status som ett juridiskt 
bindande dokument väcker naturligtvis nya frågor om det framtida skyddet 
av mänskliga rättigheterna i Europa samt stadgans förhållande till 
Europakonventionen såväl som medlemsstaternas konstitutionella 
rättigheter. 
 
Stadgans allmänna bestämmelser, placerade i det sjunde kapitlet, reglerar 
dess tillämpningsområde och syftar till att hantera konflikter mellan stadgan 
och andra källor till skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna. Det har däremot 
varit oklart hur dessa bestämmelser ska tolkas och vad de därigenom skulle 
kunna innebära. Under våren 2013 avgjorde EU-domstolen slutligen två fall, 
Åkerberg och Melloni, angående tolkningen av två av dessa allmänna 
bestämmelser. 
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är därför att undersöka sambandet mellan skyddet 
av de mänskliga rättigheterna på överstatlig nivå och på nationell nivå mot 
bakgrund av ny rättspraxis och att svara på frågan om vad stadgan kan få för 
konsekvenser för förhållandet mellan EU-rätt och nationell rätt. 
 
Som visas i denna uppsats finns det olika sätt att förstå förhållandet mellan 
EU-rätt och nationell rätt. En uppfattning är att den europeiska 
rättsordningen är överlägsen de nationella rättsordningarna och att EU-
rättsliga bestämmelser därmed alltid måste ges företräde framför nationella 
bestämmelser om dessa kolliderar. I motsats så syftar begreppet 
konstitutionell pluralism till att förstå förhållandet i en icke-hierarkisk 
mening. Enligt de teorier som kallas diskursiv konstitutionell pluralism har 
EU-rätten utvecklas genom en dialog mellan EU-domstolen och de 
nationella domstolarna och en pågående dialog mellan domstolarna är också 
en källa till legitimitet för EU-domstolen. 
 
I Åkerberg och Melloni, klargjorde EU-domstolen slutligen hur två av de 
allmänna bestämmelserna i stadgan ska tolkas. Det framgår av domstolens 
avgöranden i dessa två mål att EU-domstolen även fortsättningsvis kommer 
att påverka skyddet av de mänskliga rättigheterna på nationell nivå i stor 
utsträckning. Samtidigt är min analys att det är möjligt att förstå EU-
domstolens avgöranden som en återspegling av diskursiv konstitutionell 
pluralism och att domstolens tolkningar av de allmänna bestämmelserna har 
potential att förena den europeiska rättsordningen med de nationella 
rättsordningarna. Åkerberg och Melloni stärker därför uppfattningen att 
förhållandet mellan EU-rätt och nationell rätt bättre kan förstås i en icke-
hierarkisk mening. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 The Charter of Fundamental Rights  
With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force on 1 December 2009, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) became a 
legally binding document. Even though the Charter is not incorporated into 
any of the Treaties, Article 6 TEU states that the Charter ‘shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties’.1  
 
The drafting of the Charter started almost a decade earlier and it originates 
from the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision in Opinion 2/94.2 By 
this decision, the ECJ held that the then current Treaty did not provide 
competence for the European Union (EU) to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 Thus, an accession would only be 
possible if the Treaty was amended. Since there was no unanimity among 
the Member States to carry out such an amendment the German Presidency 
of the European Council instead proposed a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in 1999.4 In the German Presidency Conclusions it was emphasised that the 
main purpose with adopting a Charter was to make the already existing 
protection of fundamental rights in EU law, which had mainly developed 
through the ECJ’s case law, more visible to EU’s citizens.5 Aside from 
making the fundamental rights more visible, the drafting of a Charter was 
also motivated by two other factors. Firstly, it was supposed to promote 
legal certainty and secondly to enhance EU legitimacy.6  
 
Subsequently, the European Council instituted a body, which assumed the 
name ‘Convention’, to draft up the Charter. In the end, the Convention’s 
result was a compromise between differing opinions within its leadership. 
On the one hand, the Member States were prone to see the Charter as a 
purely declaratory document, while on the other hand the European Council 
and the European Parliament were more interested of a document of greater 
significance. As a result the Charter was not given legally binding status by 
incorporation into the Nice Treaty. Instead, it was ‘solemnly proclaimed’ by 
the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Commission at Nice in the year of 2000.7 
 
                                                
1 Article 6, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2010] OJ C303/17; The 
Lisbon Treaty, [2010] OJ C82/2 and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
[2010] OJ C83/389. 
2 Andersson QC, David & C Murphy, Cian, ’The Charter of Fundamental Rights’, In: 
Biondi, Andrea; Eeckhout, Piet. & Ripley, Stefanie. (eds.), EU law after Lisbon, 2012, p. 
155. 
3 Opinion 2/94 ECR I-1759. 
4 Andersson QC, David & C Murphy, Cian, op. cit., p. 155. 
5 Presidency Conclusions – Cologne 3 and 4 June 1999 (150/99 REV). 
6 Tridimas, Takis, The General Principles of EU Law, 2006, pp. 356-357. 
7 Ibid., pp. 156-159. 
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After the Charter was solemnly proclaimed, the process to make it legally 
binding continued. The question of a legally binding Charter then became 
part of an attempt to reform EU in a more comprehensive way as the Charter 
as a whole, with some minor amendments, was incorporated into the 
Constitutional Treaty. In the end, the Constitutional Treaty was never 
ratified why the legal status of the Charter remained uncertain until the 
Lisbon Treaty.8  
 
1.2 Purpose and Main Question 
The Charter provides yet another system of protection of human rights 
within Europe along with the ECHR and constitutional rights under national 
law. Even though the Charter is primarily directed to the EU and its 
institutions, it is also binding on the Member States when they implement 
Union law. The protection of human rights in Europe can therefore be said 
to exist in three different spheres; at international level where the Member 
States are bound by international human rights treaties such as the ECHR, at 
supranational level where the Member States are bound by the Charter when 
they implement Union law, and finally at national level by constitutional 
rights.9 They so called horizontal provisions placed in the Charter’s seventh 
chapter govern the Charter’s field of application and aims at avoiding and 
managing conflicts between these different levels of protection.  
 
How the so-called horizontal provisions should be interpreted and what 
effect the Charter thereby might have on the relationship between EU law 
and national law have been subject to discussion in the academic literature.10 
During the spring of 2013, the ECJ finally settled two cases concerning the 
interpretation of two of the horizontal provisions, Åkerberg and Melloni. 
These two cases cast new light on the interpretation of the horizontal 
provisions and thus contribute with new perspectives.  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine the relationship 
between the protection of human rights at supranational level and the 
protection of human rights at national level in light of recent case law. 
Consequently, the main question, which will be examined in this thesis, is: 
 
                                                
8 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, EU law: text, cases, and materials, 2011, p. 394.  
9 See Torres Pérez. Aida, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union – A Theory of 
Supranational Adjudication, 2009, p. 27. 
10 See e.g. Besselink, Leonard F.M, The Member States, the National Constitutions and the 
Scope of the Charter, 2001; Biondi, Andrea; Eeckhout, Piet. & Ripley, Stefanie. (eds.), EU 
law after Lisbon, 2012 and Mock, William B.T. & Demuro, Gianmario. (eds.), Human 
rights in Europe: commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2010. 
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What are the implications of the Charter for the relationship between EU 
law and national law? 
 
With respect to the purpose of my thesis, this question should not be 
understood as to only include the relationship between the European legal 
order and the national legal orders, but also to what extent EU law can 
influence and govern the protection of human rights at national level.  
 
1.3 Delimitations 
Since the research question of this thesis is not discrete it has been necessary 
to make some delimitations. Firstly, it should be highlighted that there are of 
course a lot of interesting discussions in the academic literature regarding 
the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR. One of the most 
interesting aspects is that the Lisbon Treaty did not only turn the Charter 
into a legally binding document, but Article 6 TEU now states that the EU 
shall accede to the ECHR. Thus, the Charter’s relation to the ECHR is 
naturally of interest to anyone who seeks to accomplish a comprehensive 
study of human rights issues in Europe. However, the aim of this thesis is 
not to conduct a comprehensive study, but I will be focusing on the 
relationship between EU law and national law.  
 
Secondly, another significant delimitation is that this thesis focuses on the 
horizontal provisions of the Charter why I will not describe or discuss the 
actual rights that are being protected by the Charter. Furthermore, the 
horizontal provisions are contained in Article 51-Article 54 of the Charter. 
Since the main purpose of this thesis is to examine what can be concluded 
about the relationship between EU law and national law in light of Åkerberg 
and Melloni, I have decided to focus on Article 51, Article 52(4) and Article 
53 of the Charter. These provisions have been selected with respect to the 
questions that Åkerberg and Melloni brought before the ECJ. 
 
Yet another delimitation is that even though the role of the national courts is 
discussed more generally in this thesis, the main focus will be on the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (FCC). This choice is motivated 
by the fact that the FCC has voiced its positioned clearly in a number of 
cases and most recently it responded to the ECJ’s ruling in Åkerberg.  
 
Lastly, it should also be emphasised that not all Member States fully agreed 
to the idea of a legally binding Charter why a protocol, on the application of 
the Charter to Poland and the UK, was added to the Treaty.11 The protocol 
might therefore entail that the Charter does not have the same implications 
in UK and Poland as in the other Member States. Even so, this issue will not 
be addressed in this thesis since I am interested of the potential effect of the 
Charter on a more general level.  
                                                
11 Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
to Poland and to the United Kingdom [2007] OJ C306/156.  
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1.4 Method and Material 
My research question will be answered by using a traditional legal method. 
Since the protection of fundamental rights in EU law has mainly developed 
through the ECJ’s case law, these cases are of course one of my most 
important sources. In addition, cases from the FCC will bee examined in 
order to study the nature of the relationship between the ECJ and the 
national courts.  
 
Another important source is of course the academic literature and the 
theories that have been developed by prominent scholars concerning the 
relationship between EU law and national law as well as regarding the 
possible implications of the Charter. This literature will be used to analyse 
the ECJ’s previous case law and to discuss my research question. However, 
since the two cases I am focusing on, Åkerberg and Melloni, were delivered 
only a couple of months ago, there are yet no published articles discussing 
these two cases. The analyse of Åkerberg and Melloni will therefore be the 
result of my own interpretation, even though I try to connect it to the 
theories that have already been developed by scholars. This also entails that 
I am faced with a great challenge since the ECJ’s rulings are not always 
easy to interpret and the implications of its statements are seldom self-
evident. Even so, this thesis is an attempt to at an early stage analyse the 
consequences of Åkerberg and Melloni.  
 
It should also be highlighted that I will not be entirely consistent in my 
references. What was previously called the Community and Community law 
are after the entrance of the Lisbon Treaty and the abolishment of the three-
pillar structure instead called the EU and EU law. Therefore, when suitable 
with regard to the situation, I will use Community/Community law or 
EU/EU law.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
Since my research question aims to discuss the implications of the Charter 
for the relationship between EU law and national law, chapter 2 of this 
thesis is dedicated to discuss the relationship between the European legal 
order and the national legal orders. As a part of this discussion, I will also 
address the role of the ECJ and the role of the national courts. In chapter 3, 
the attention will then be turned to the horizontal provisions of the Charter, 
which I have decided to focus on. This part of the thesis aims at identifying 
the function of the horizontal provisions and to present some of the issues 
that have been raised in the academic literature. Finally, in chapter 4, I will 
analyse Åkerberg and Melloni and discuss what these two cases might entail 
for the relationship between EU law and national law.  
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2 The Relationship Between EU 
Law and National Law 
2.1 Two Aspects of Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft 
To begin with, as a way of examining the relationship between EU law and 
national law, I will start by exploring two aspect of the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case. As I will show in the following, this case is part 
of two separate, yet closely connected, developments in EU law: the 
supremacy of EU law and the protection of fundamental rights.  
 
2.1.1 Supremacy of EU Law 
In 1963 the ECJ first established the doctrine of direct effect in Van Gend en 
Loos.12 This doctrine applies to all EU law even though its application is 
more limited with regard to directives. Exactly what direct effect entails is 
quite difficult to summarise since it is a contested concept that has been 
given different meanings. Put simply, at risk of oversimplifications, it means 
that provisions of EU law have the capacity to confer rights upon 
individuals and when these provisions are sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional, individuals can invoke them before national courts.13 Hence, 
one consequence of direct effect is that in Member States with a dualistic 
legal tradition there might be situations where individuals can rely on both 
provisions of EU law and provisions of national law before the national 
court. In other words, there is a potential for a conflict of norms deriving 
from two different legal orders.  
 
In legal systems, the conflict between two norms that are both applicable but 
entail different end results is commonly solved by a hierarchical model, 
which provides that the superior norm has precedence (lex superior).14 
Implementing this model with respect to the relationship between the 
European legal order and the national legal orders, the question would 
naturally be: which norm is highest in the hierarchy, national law or EU 
law?  
 
In 1964, the ECJ established the principle of supremacy in Costa v Enel, 
stating that Community law had to have primacy over national law.15 Hence, 
the ECJ’s solution to the conflict between the provisions of EU law and 
                                                
12 Case C-26/62 NV Algmene Transporten Expedite Ondernemig van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Adminstartie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
13 Craig, & De Búrca, op. cit., p. 180. 
14 Torres Pérez, op. cit, p. 41. 
15 Case 6/64 Flamino Costa v. E.N.E.L.[1964] ECR 585. 
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provisions of national law was to give precedence to EU law. The Court’s 
arguments were that the EEC Treaty had established an own legal order, 
which became an integral part of the Member States’ legal systems on the 
day of the entry of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Court held that the Member 
States had limited their sovereign rights, although within limited fields, by 
creating the Community and thereby had created a body of law that must be 
binding on them. In addition, the Court emphasised that the objectives of the 
Treaty could not be accomplished if the Member States could chose not to 
apply Community law.16  
 
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the principle of supremacy was taken 
one step further as the ECJ held that Community law had to prevail even 
over the Member States own constitutions. The plaintiffs argued at national 
level that two Community regulations infringed on their rights under the 
German Constitution.17 Put simply, the plaintiffs tried to use German 
constitutional rights as a ground for judicial review of Community 
measures. The German Administrative Court shared this view and held the 
legislation in question to be void since it ran counter to principles of 
German Basic Law. However, the matter was referred to the ECJ.18 
 
The ECJ on the other hand was not willing to abandon the principle of 
supremacy so easily and stressed the importance of uniformity and efficacy 
of Community law. Furthermore, the Court underlined the status of 
Community law as an independent source of law why only Community law 
could be used to decide whether Community measures should be declared 
void or not. In sum, the ECJ found that Community law could not be 
challenged on the basis that it was in conflict with national constitutional 
rights or with national constitutional principles.19  
 
Yet another dimension of the principle of supremacy is evident from the 
case Simmenthal, by which the ECJ established the principle of pre-
emption. The Court declared that the principle of supremacy entails that the 
national courts must set aside provisions of national law if they are 
conflicting with Community rules, regardless of whether the national 
provisions were adopted prior to or after the Community rule in question.20 
As the Court continued, it also stated that this was not only an obligation for 
the constitutional courts, but all national courts.21 However, as the case 
IN.CO.GE’9022 illustrates, the fact that national courts must set aside 
national provisions contrary to EU law does not necessarily mean that the 
                                                
16 Case 6/64 Flamino Costa v. E.N.E.L.[1964] ECR 585, at pp. 594-595. 
17 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide 
[1970] ECR 1125. 
18 Ibid., para 2. 
19 Ibid., para 3. 
20 Case 106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR-
629, paras. 17-21.  
21 Ibid., paras. 21-24. 
22 Case C-10-22/97 Ministero dello Finanze v IN.CO.GE’90 and Others [1998] ECR I-
6307. 
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national provisions must be declared void. In contrast, they are just 
inapplicable.23 
 
2.1.2 The Protection of Fundamental Rights 
As already mentioned previously in this thesis, one of the purposes with 
adopting a Charter was to make the already existing protection of 
fundamental rights more visible to EU’s citizens. In this section, I will 
briefly examine the ECJ’s pre-Lisbon case law on the protection of 
fundamental rights. As will be shown in the following, the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case played a significant part to this development.  
 
The Treaty of Rome, founding the Community, contains no explicit 
reference to the protection of fundamental rights, which can be explained by 
the fact that the Community in the early days was intended to focus purely 
on economic integration. With only competence to act for economic 
integration such a reference did not appear to be necessary.24 Even so, as 
Community law developed and the ECJ established the doctrine of direct 
effect and the principle of supremacy, the impact of Community law on 
Member States as well as individuals became evident.25  
 
Initially, the ECJ rejected that the Community had to respect constitutional 
rights under national law.26 However, the principle of supremacy led to 
growing concerns that Community law could impair the protection of 
human rights provided for by the Member States’ constitutions.27 Especially 
the German and Italian Constitutional Courts expressed their concerns for 
the lack of protection of human rights, which increased the pressure on the 
Community to act. As a result, the ECJ took a first step towards a new 
approach on human rights issues.28  
 
In 1969, the ECJ overruled its previous case law and held in Stauder that a 
Community act could be interpreted in a certain way with the effect that it 
would not impair ‘the protection of fundamental human rights enshrined in 
the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court’.29 The 
mere reference to fundamental rights as general principles made headway 
for the leading case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.30 
 
                                                
23 Groussot, Xavier, The Role of the National Courts in the European Union: A Future 
Perspective, 2005, p. 16. 
24 Tridimas, op. cit., pp. 298-300.  
25 Zetterquist, Ola, ’The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Res Publica’ In: 
Giacomo, Di Federico (ed.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to 
Binding Instrument, 2011, pp. 4-5. 
26 See e.g. Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17. 
27 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., pp. 364-365. 
28 Zetterquist, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
29 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419, para. 7. 
30 Tridimas, op. cit., pp. 300-301. 
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As already evident from the previous section of this thesis, the ECJ restated 
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that Community law had to be given 
primacy. However, the Court also elaborated on fundamental rights: 
 
In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such 
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of 
the Community…31 
 
As highlighted by Takis Tridimas, the ECJ did not only take the principle of 
supremacy as far as possible, but also gave the Member States some 
reassurance that fundamental rights would be respected continually. By 
calling the constitutional traditions common to the Member States an 
inspiration to Community law, but nothing more, the Court also ensured the 
autonomy of Community law. Furthermore, since the protection of 
fundamental rights had to be ensured within the framework of Community 
law, the Court assigned to itself the task of safeguarding the protection of 
fundamental rights. Even though the ruling has been heavily criticized, 
Tridimas do not consider Internationale Handelsgesellschaft to be the result 
of judicial activism. Instead, he finds that it would be difficult to argue that 
the Court should have taken another direction. The Member States’ 
constitutional traditions justified the notion that Community law and 
Community institutions had to respect fundamental rights. Being part of the 
Community legal order, the protection of fundamental rights had to be 
adjusted to the specific nature of that legal order and could not be a replica 
of protection of human rights at national level.32 Notably, in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, the Court did not consider the Community regulations 
in question to be contrary to fundamental rights of Community law.33  
 
In following case law, the ECJ became more prone to perceive national 
constitutions as an inspiration when interpreting EU fundamental rights. In 
Nold, the ECJ reiterated that fundamental rights are general principles that 
must be ensured by the Court. However, this time around the Court 
continued and underlined the importance of the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States as a source of inspiration and held that 
measures that could impair the protection of constitutional rights were 
incompatible with Community law. In this connection, the Court also 
emphasised that international human rights treaties should also be an 
inspiration and guideline within the framework of Community law.34 This 
new approach was restated in Hauer where references were made both to 
some of the Member States’ constitutions and to the ECHR.35 However, as 
Tridimas has pointed out, both Nold and Hauer also shows that even though 
the ECJ accepted that it had to respect the Member States’ constitutional 
                                                
31 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 4. 
32 Tridimas, op. cit., pp. 302-304.  
33 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 20. 
34 Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European 
Communities [1974] ECR 491, para. 13. 
35 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paras. 15-20. 
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rights it continued to create its own interpretation of those rights. Thus, the 
ECJ did not only respond to the demands of ensuring the protection of 
constitutional rights, but also started to create a EU standard of protection 
somewhat other than the national standard of protection.36  
 
In subsequent case law the ECJ extended the field of application of EU 
fundamental rights as it held that the Member States, when acting within the 
scope of EU law, had to comply with them.37 In other words, that not only 
the validity of EU measures had to be reviewed in light of EU fundamental 
rights, but also measures by the Member States falling within the scope of 
EU law. It has, however, been questioned whether this development showed 
true concern from the ECJ regarding the protection of human rights or if the 
ECJ simply used fundamental rights as a way of extending the impact of EU 
law.38 In contrast, other scholars have defended it and argued that it was an 
inevitable development.39 Nevertheless, this development will be further 
examined under section 3.2 of this thesis.  
 
2.2 Reactions from the National Courts 
The question of the relationship between EU law and national law is not 
only a question of the relationship between the European legal order and the 
national legal orders, but also of the ECJ and the national courts. In the 
following, it will be discussed how the national courts have reacted to the 
principle of supremacy, in particular concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights. For reasons that have already been explained previously 
in this thesis, the main focus in this part will be on the FCC.  
 
As already stated above, the principle of supremacy entails that EU law has 
primacy over national law, even over the Member States’ constitutions. 
Furthermore, it entails two kinds of obligations for the national courts. 
Firstly, the national courts have a positive obligation to set aside national 
provisions if they are conflicting with EU law. Secondly, the national courts 
have a negative obligation to not review EU legislative acts in light of their 
own constitutions. The negative obligation of the national courts is thereby 
closely connected to the question of judicial kompetenz-kompetenz. In other 
words, which court, the ECJ or the national courts, is to decide over the 
limits of the Union’s competence and which court has the capacity to review 
the validity of EU law and to declare acts of the Union ultra vires? The 
answer given to these questions from the ECJ has been that the ECJ is the 
                                                
36 Tridimas, op. cit., pp. 303-304. 
37 See e.g. Case 36/75 Roland Rutili v The Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219; Case 
5/88 Wachauf v. Germany [1989] ECR 2609 and Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia 
Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis [1991] ECR I-2951. 
38 Coppel, Jason & O’Neill, Aidan, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights 
Seriously?, 1992.  
39 Weiler, Joseph H.H & Lockhart, Nicolas J.S, Taking Rights Seriously: The European 
Court of Justice and its Fundamental Right Jurisprudence Part I-II, 1995. 
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competent court. However, some of the Member States constitutional courts 
have challenged its position as the final arbitrator.40 
 
The general approach among the national courts has been acceptance to the 
principle of supremacy, although, this acceptance has been subject to 
qualifications. One qualification is that some national courts have based the 
acceptance of the supremacy of EU law on provisions of their own 
constitution and thereby not fully agreed to the ECJ’s reasoning in Costa v 
Enel. Another qualification is that some courts have limited the principle of 
supremacy so that EU law cannot have precedence over the most important 
provisions of the constitution, for example the constitutional rights.41 
 
This is also the case with the German courts. The Honeywell42 case from 
2010 envisages a general acceptance to the principle of supremacy. 
However, this acceptance has some significant limitations.43  
 
To begin with, the German Administrative Court was not entirely satisfied 
with the ECJ’s ruling in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and therefore 
referred the matter to the FCC. In 1974, the FCC held in Solange I (so long 
as) that the German Constitution did not allow a transfer of sovereign rights 
to an inter-state institution if it included a transfer of powers to alter 
absolute and essential features of the German constitutional structure such 
as the protection of German basic rights. Furthermore, it considered that the 
Community, at the then current level of integration and in lack of a written 
Bill of Rights, did not provide an adequate protection for fundamental 
rights.44 In conclusion, the FCC held that it would not surrender its 
jurisdiction to rule on conflicts between Community law and German basic 
rights, and in case of such a conflict the German Constitution had to 
prevail.45 Notably, the ECJ had decided on the previously mentioned Nold 
case two weeks before the Solange I ruling. However, the FCC did not make 
any reference to it.46 
 
In 1986, the FCC altered its earlier position in the case that came to be 
known as Solange II. The FCC held that because of the development of the 
protection of fundamental rights in Community law, the court would no 
longer practice its jurisdiction to review Community measures so long as 
the protection of fundamental rights would continually be ensured at the 
then present level. As a sign of development, Nold and subsequent case law 
were mentioned.47 Thus, in Solange II, the FCC still challenged the ECJ’s 
position as the final arbitrator and reserved the right to safeguard the 
protection of German basic rights. Though, it also softened its previous 
                                                
40 Groussot, op. cit., p. 14. 
41 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., pp. 268-269. 
42 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, 6 july 2012. 
43 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., p. 272. 
44 BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974] 2 CMLR 540, at pp. 549-550. 
45 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., p. 274. 
46 Kokott, Juliane, German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration: Part I, 
1996, p. 247. 
47 BVerfGE 73, 399 [1987] 3 CMLR 225, at p. 265. 
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position by stating that it would not practice its jurisdiction so long as the 
Community could adequately protect German basic rights instead. 
 
Up until the Maastricht48 decision in 1993, the FCC had mainly been 
concerned with the protection of fundamental rights. The novelty with the 
Maastricht decision was that the FCC took on to review the Maastricht 
Treaty’s compliance with the German Constitution before ratification and 
addressed the limits to transfer of powers to the EC. One of the most 
significant aspects of this ruling is that the FCC held that the Member States 
are ‘the master of the Treaties’. Thus, the FCC established, in contrast to 
what had been held by the ECJ, that it had the competence to define the 
limits to the Community’s jurisdiction and to declare acts of the Community 
ultra vires.49 This conclusion, which has also been called the ultra vires-
lock, was restated in the Lisbon50 decision. However, the FCC eventually 
softened its position in the previously mentioned case Honeywell. Even so, 
it should also be noted that in the Lisbon decision, aside from reaffirming 
the ultra vires lock, the FCC also held that the German Constitutional 
identity had to be respected and the FCC thereby established what has been 
called the identity-lock.51  
 
In addition to the question of the limits to transfer of powers to the EC, the 
FCC once again addressed the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Maastricht decision and held that: 
 
However, the Court exercises its jurisdiction on the applicability of secondary 
Community legislation in Germany in a relationship of cooperation with the 
European Court, under which that Court guarantees protection of basic rights in 
any particular case for the whole area of the European Communities, and the 
Constitutional Court can therefore restrict itself to a general guarantee of the 
constitutional standard that cannot be dispensed with.52 
This statement has been subject to different interpretations; one of them 
being that it was simply a restatement of Solange II.53 In the banana54 case, 
the FCC’s competence to review Community law in light of the German 
Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights was again raised. With 
references to Solange II and the Maastricht decision, the FCC ruled that the 
case was inadmissible and held that it could only review Community 
measures if it could be proven that the Community provided a lower level of 
protection than the German Constitution.55  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the FCC has in a number of cases challenged 
the ECJ’s position as the final arbitrator. Even though clear statements were 
                                                
48 BVerfGE 89, 155 [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
49 Kolkott, op. cit., see especially p. 238 and pp. 260-261.  
50 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 june 2009. 
51 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., pp. 277-280. 
52 BVerfGE 89, 155 [1994]1 CMLR 57, at p. 79. 
53 Groussot, op. cit., p. 25. 
54 BVerfGE 102, 147. 
55 BVerfGE 102, 147 and Groussot, op. cit., p. 28.  
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being made in Solange I and the Maastricht decision, the FCC softened its 
previous position in both Solange II and Honeywell.56  
 
2.3 Constitutional Pluralism 
2.3.1 A Non-Hierarchical Relationship 
As evident from the section above, there can be said to be a difference 
between how the ECJ and how the national courts have viewed the principle 
of supremacy. The ECJ have held that EU law must have supremacy over 
national law, even over the Member States’ constitutions, and positioned 
itself as the final arbitrator. However, this view has been contested and it 
has been argued that the national constitutions must have supremacy. The 
rationale for this view is that all state actions must be in compliance with the 
constitution since it is the highest norm in the national legal order. 
Additionally, a transfer of powers from the constitution to the EU would not 
be in accordance with constitutional provisions if it allowed violations of 
constitutional rights. In fact, this is how the FCC reasoned in Solange I. A 
second line of argumentation for the constitutions’ precedence over EU law 
is based on the constitutional theory claiming that the people are the 
ultimate source of legitimacy for any legal order. National constitutions 
therefore should prevail over EU law since national constitutions are the 
result of the will of the people.57  
 
Evidently, these two perspectives are contrary to each other as they present 
conflicting solutions to the question of which legal order is supreme, they 
cannot both be correct. However, it has been contested whether the 
hierarchical model, entailing that one legal system is always superior to the 
other, can rightfully explain the European integration and the relationship 
between the European legal order and the national legal orders.  
 
To begin with, it should be noted that the principle of supremacy is much 
more ambiguous than previously revealed in this thesis. It has been 
highlighted that the ECJ has only used the phrase ‘supremacy’ in two cases 
and that it instead has used the phrase ‘primacy’ much more often to 
describe the notion that EU law must prevail over national law. In the 
academic literature, both supremacy and primacy have been used frequently. 
It has been questioned whether there might be a conceptual difference 
embedded in the different terminologies that goes beyond semantics. 
According to Avbelj, three different models of describing the relationship 
between EU law and national law can be discerned in the academic 
literature as well as in the ECJ’s case law and the national courts’ case law. 
Firstly, the hierarchical model only uses the phrase supremacy and sees the 
European legal order as supreme to the national legal orders, why all 
national legislation in conflict with EU law must be invalid. Secondly, the 
                                                
56 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., p. 279. 
57 Torres Pérez, op. cit. pp. 42-44 and 50-53.   
 22 
conditionally hierarchical model makes no difference between supremacy 
and primacy and accepts that there are limits to the supremacy of the 
European legal order. Lastly, the heterarchical model never uses the phrase 
supremacy since it denies that the relationship between EU law and national 
law is hierarchical. Instead, the principle of primacy should be used and 
only be understood as entailing an obligation for the national courts to 
disapply national law in conflict with EU law; in contrast to entailing that 
the conflicting national law is invalid.58  
 
Aside from the fact that the principle of supremacy in itself is ambiguous, it 
has been held that one of the flaws with the hierarchical model is that it fails 
to recognize that both EU law and national law have had an influential 
effect on each other. According to the hierarchical model there can only be a 
one-way effect where the highest norm influences the lower norm. The 
opposite would be against the very nature of a relationship were one norm is 
always the ‘master’ and the other the ‘serf’. But in reality it is not only the 
national legal orders that have been influenced by EU law. Indeed, the 
development of the protection of fundamental rights in EU law is one 
example of when the European legal order has adapted itself to principles of 
the national constitutions.59 More generally, its been argued that one of the 
functions of general principles are that they have an influential effect and 
‘travel back and forth from the national legal systems to the EU’.60  
 
In the academic literature there is one concept, which will be further 
examined in the next section of this thesis, that clearly seeks an alternative 
way of describing the relationship between EU law and national law: 
constitutional pluralism. Put simply, this concept is based on the notion that 
both the European legal order and the national legal orders have to bee seen 
as autonomous legal orders with their own constitutions. Thus, both legal 
orders have its independent sources of law and are functioning according to 
its own rules. Furthermore, within the territory of a Member State, the legal 
orders are co-existing and since they are autonomous they are in fact 
denying the existence of each other. Hence, constitutional pluralism 
recognises that the relationship between national law and state territory is 
not an exclusive one.61  
 
2.3.2 Defining the Concept 
As evident from the section above, one aspect of the concept constitutional 
pluralism is that it seeks to understand the relationship between EU law and 
national law in a non-hierarchical sense. However, constitutional pluralism 
                                                
58 Avbelj, Matej, Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law-(Why) Does it Matter?, 2011.  
59Barents, René, The Precedence of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional 
Pluralism, 2009, pp. 440-441. 
60 Lenaerts, Koen & Guitiérrez-Fons, José A., The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and 
General Principles of EU law, 2010, p. 1653. 
61 Barents, op. cit., pp. 438-439. 
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is not one thing, containing only one meaning. Instead, it has been discussed 
in many different ways.62 
 
It first surfaced in an article by Neil MacCormick63, even though he did not 
call it constitutional pluralism at the time. Up until then, the common view 
had been that the European legal order had to have supremacy over the 
national legal orders and that all national courts should accept this principle. 
Even so, the FCC’s ruling in the Maastricht decision envisaged that the 
national courts still did not accept the supremacy of EU law 
unconditionally.64 In his article, MacCormick analysed the FCC’s ruling in 
the Maastricht decision and argued that it could be understood as in 
accordance with pluralistic legal theory. According to this theory, the 
relationship between different legal orders is in fact pluralistic and not 
monistic just as it is interactive and not hierarchical.65 From then on, the 
idea developed and started to be called by its name. As already stated, 
different scholars have developed and understood this concept in quite 
different ways. Among these theories there are six different concepts that 
have been more developed and therefore more influential.66  
 
Thus, when discussing constitutional pluralism it is necessary to define 
which understanding of constitutional pluralism that is being presented and 
relied on. Based on the history of the protection of fundamental rights in EU 
law, which is to some extent the result of the pressure put on the ECJ by the 
national courts, I consider it to actually be the result of interplay between the 
courts. Therefore, I find the theories that have focused on a shared discourse 
between the courts to be particularly interesting and to contribute with 
useful perspectives. Two of them will be further examined under the next 
section of this thesis.  
 
2.3.3 Discursive Constitutional Pluralism 
Miguel Poiares Maduro has developed one of the more influential concepts; 
harmonious discursive constitutional pluralism.67 According to Maduro, 
constitutional pluralism in practice consists of the fact that the relationship 
between the national courts and the ECJ is based on a dialogue. This 
dialogue and the co-operation between the courts have mainly developed 
through the system of preliminary rulings.68  
 
                                                
62 See e.g. Avbelj, Matej & Komárek, Jan (eds.), Four visions of constitutional pluralism, 
2008; Pernice, Ingolf, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 2002, and 
Avbelj, Matej & Komárek, Jan (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and 
Beyond, 2012. 
63 MacCormick, Neil, The Maastricht Urteil: Soveriegnity Now, 1995 
64 Avbelj, & Komárek (eds.), op. cit., p. 2. 
65 MacCormick, op. cit., p. 259.   
66 Avbelj, & Komárek (eds.), 2012, op. cit., pp. 2-4. 
67 Ibid., p. 6. 
68 Maduro Poiares, Miguel, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in 
Action, In: Walker, Neil (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, 2003, pp. 511-513 
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Maduro claims that the European legal order developed through, and based 
its legitimacy on, a discourse with the national courts. Since the ECJ held 
that individuals could under certain circumstances invoke their EU rights 
before a national court, EU law became a new source of law for litigants to 
base their claims on. Individuals therefore became important actors with 
respect to the development of EU law aside from the ECJ and the national 
courts. Furthermore, the national courts were thereby given a significant 
task since the effective incorporation of EU law into the national legal 
orders became their responsibility. In this respect, the system of preliminary 
rulings played a significant part where the ECJ assumed the role of 
interpreting EU law while the national courts, by asking for preliminary 
rulings and enforcing these rulings, granted the ECJ’s decision the same 
legal value as national judicial decisions. Hence, the European legal order 
could be said to have developed through, and been legitimised by, a legal 
discourse between the ECJ on the one hand and the national courts and 
individuals on the other. According to Maduro, this discourse is also 
continuing and the best understanding of the European legal order is 
achieved by understanding that these actors are all part of one legal 
community. Therefore, the interpretations of EU law and the legal outcomes 
of it are the result of the legal community as a whole, and ‘a discourse 
among equals’, instead of only the ECJ.69 
 
Maduro does not only consider the European legal order to have developed 
through a discourse in practice, but he also sees this discourse as a strong 
argument for claiming that the European legal order should not be subject to 
a hierarchical model and that a hierarchical model would in fact harm its 
legitimacy. Put differently, there is no need to answer the question of which 
legal order is superior and which court is the final arbitrator as long as the 
different views of the ECJ and the national courts do not harm the European 
integration. Instead, legal pluralism should be welcomed.70 However, there 
must still be some principles that all participants agree to in order to ensure 
harmony, otherwise the competing visions of the ECJ and the national 
courts could render to disintegration.71 As I see it, Maduro basically claims 
that the shared discourse must be subjected to some common rules. 
Regarding the question of how to prevent constitutional conflicts, Maduro 
argues that it is essential that both the European legal order and the national 
legal orders can adept themselves to the other legal order’s claim of 
authority. As an example, he raises that the national courts should be 
granted an increased margin of discretion, and in return the national courts 
should not review the validity of specific EU legal acts.72 
 
This approach is also to some extent detectible in one of Maduro’s opinions 
from his time as an Advocate General. It should be noted that the Charter 
had not become legally binding yet when this case was brought before the 
Court why Maduro is referring to fundamental rights as general principles. 
                                                
69 Ibid., pp. 513-517. 
70 Ibid., pp. 520-523. 
71 Ibid., pp. 523-524. 
72 Ibid., pp. 533-534. 
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The case concerned the validity of a Community directive that conflicted 
with provisions in the French Constitution. In this connection, Maduro 
raised the question of how to protect national constitutions without 
undermining the principle of primacy. Maduro held that Article 6 TEU has a 
dual function. First of all it should be viewed as an assurance to the Member 
States that Community law will not threaten the fundamental values of their 
constitutions since said article expresses respect for the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States. At the same time, he held that 
Article 6 TEU entails that the Member States have left it to the ECJ to 
safeguard those values within the scope of Community law. Furthermore, he 
argued that constitutional values should not be used as a review of 
Community legal acts since that could imply different end-results in 
different Member States. If the European legal order allowed such varieties 
in the application of Community law it would not be based on the rule of 
law why Community law must prevail over national law. Even though 
Maduro held that national courts must accept the principle of primacy, he 
also highlighted that the national courts have an important role in 
interpreting general principles and fundamental rights of Community law 
and that the system of preliminary rulings opens up for such a dialogue.73 
Thus, even though slightly more pragmatic in his role as an Advocate 
General, Maduro emphasised the possibility of a shared discourse through 
the system of preliminary rulings. However, it has been pointed out that the 
uniformity in application of EU law, which Maduro found necessary, would 
probably entail a greater sacrifice of national identity than is evident in his 
reasoning.74 
 
With respect to the protection of fundamental rights, Aida Torres Pérez has 
discussed the possibility of a shared discourse between the ECJ and the 
national courts and offers a normative theory for ECJ adjudication, which 
favours a certain degree of diversity. As a point of departure she emphasises 
that when the Member States are acting within the scope of EU law there is 
a potential risk for conflicts between EU fundamental rights and 
constitutional rights. Also, there is a risk that the EU level of protection falls 
bellow the level of protection provided for by the national constitution. 
Torres does not consider it suitable to solve this potential conflict by using a 
hierarchical model, trying to establish which norm is highest in the 
hierarchy, since the hierarchical model fails to recognise the reality of 
European integration. Instead, she focuses on the ‘legitimacy of the 
European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) claim of authority in adjudicating EU 
fundamental rights’. In other words, why should it be accepted that the ECJ, 
a supranational court, has the authority to interpret supranational rights, 
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74 Craig & De Búrca, op. cit., pp. 299-300.  
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which national courts have to apply even if they conflict with constitutional 
rights?75  
 
According to Torres, the ECJ’s legitimacy could be based on the ideal of a 
dialogue. To begin with, Torres finds it necessary to first answer whether 
EU fundamental rights must be interpreted uniformly or if some diversity 
between the Member States should be allowed. She finds that both solutions 
have different benefits. If interpreted uniformly, for example, the unity and 
efficacy of EU law would be secured and it would also guarantee equality. 
However, allowing state diversity would, for example, secure democratic 
self-government. Altogether, Torres finds that state autonomy justifies the 
allowance of a certain degree of diversity. However, this should not be 
viewed as in starch contrast to a uniform interpretation. The point she makes 
is just that the development of a common supranational standard should not 
be ‘through a hierarchical imposition of ECJ standards’ since it has no 
legitimacy. Instead, the legitimacy of the ECJ should be sought by 
interpreting EU fundamental rights through an on-going dialogue between 
the ECJ and the national courts.76 
 
Put simply, Torres considers that the purpose of the dialogue would be to 
seek an interpretation that is rationally agreeable to all national courts since 
it would show equal respect to the constitutional identity of all Member 
States and further better-reasoned decisions. For this dialogue the system of 
preliminary rulings is the vehicle and provides an opportunity to establish a 
dialogue that is non-hierarchical. When interpreting EU fundamental rights, 
the ECJ should therefore consider the Member States’ constitutional rights 
and use comparative reasoning. The legitimacy of its interpretation would 
also be further enhanced if the use of comparative reasoning were 
emphasised in the Court’s rulings. Furthermore, Torres states that this sort 
of dialogue could arguably also lead to an exercise of deference to the 
interpretation of a right at national level, even though it is not necessarily a 
consequence of a dialogue between the courts. The situations she finds this 
most likely to happen in is when the ECJ reviews a Member State’s measure 
that is only remotely related to EU law and when the national standard 
offers a higher level of protection.77 
 
To sum up, both Maduro and Torres have focused on a shared discourse 
between the ECJ and the national courts and consider an on-going dialogue 
to be a source of legitimacy for the ECJ. It is also evident that there is a 
tension between uniformity and diversity. Maduro has addressed the tension 
that exists on a more general level between a uniform application of EU law 
and the Member States national identity. In this respect, he has highlighted 
that EU law has to prevail over national constitutions in order to secure a 
uniform application of EU law and that this is a consequence of the rule of 
law. However, he has also argued that the national courts have an important 
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function to contribute to the ECJ’s interpretations through the system of 
preliminary rulings.  
 
Torres on the other hand has focused entirely on the protection of 
fundamental rights and the ECJ’s review of measures by Member States. 
Here the tension between uniformity and diversity lays in whether EU 
fundamental rights should be interpreted uniformly or if it should be 
accepted that they are interpreted slightly differently in different Member 
States. According to Torres, a common EU standard of protection should be 
developed through a dialogue between the national courts. However, this 
dialogue could also lead to an exercise of deference in some cases.  
 28 
3 The Horizontal Provisions 
3.1 A Legally Binding Charter 
As the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the Charter became legally binding 
and was given the same legal value as the Treaties. Naturally, the question 
arises what this will entail for the future and the protection of fundamental 
rights in the post-Lisbon context. Alan Rosas has highlighted that a legally 
binding Charter does not alter the Union’s previous status, it does not turn 
into a human rights organisation just as the ECJ will not all of the sudden be 
a human rights court. The consequences are much less dramatic.78 Even so, 
the implications of a legally binding Charter have been discussed at length 
in the academic literature ever since the EU first started to draft a Charter, it 
is therefore not a completely new issue, and it seems like all possible 
scenarios have been dealt with.79  
 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I examined different ways of describing the 
relationship between EU law and national law. In the following I will 
examine the horizontal provisions that I have decided to focus on and try to 
identify their function as well as what they might entail for the relationship 
between EU law and national law. 
 
3.2 The Field of Application 
Article 51 of the Charter governs the Charter’s field of application and the 
article states that:  
 
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of 
the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.’  
2.  The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties. 80 
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Article 51(1) clarifies that the Charter is primarily addressed to the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. It has been pointed 
out that this conclusion is almost redundant considering the history of 
fundamental rights and the fact that one of the most important objectives 
with drafting a Charter was to secure the protection of human rights in EU 
law.81 Secondly, the Charter is addressed to the Member States, but only 
‘when they are implementing Union law’.  
 
During the drafting of the Charter, the wordings of Article 51(1) were one 
of the most debated questions and the wordings of the article were changed 
several times during the process.82 The vagueness of this formulation, 
compared with previous case law, will be discussed under section 3.2.1. 
Firstly, it should be clarified why the Charter’s field of application matters 
for the relationship between EU law and national law.  
 
As Torres highlighted, and used as a point of departure for her theory, the 
incorporation of EU fundamental rights to the states has resulted in that 
there are areas were EU fundamental rights and constitutional rights might 
overlap and conflict. When Member States act within the scope of EU law 
they are not only bound by constitutional rights under national law but also 
by EU fundamental rights. As a result, a national court, faced with the task 
of reviewing state acts, has to decide which norm to apply. From the 
perspective of constitutional law, the national court must apply the 
constitutional rights. From the perspective of EU, the Member States must 
apply EU fundamental rights if the legislation falls within the scope of EU 
law. If the national court has any doubts about the interpretation of the EU 
standard of protection it must make a reference for a preliminary ruling to 
the ECJ. Even though the ECJ cannot decide on the validity of the national 
legislation, the Court’s interpretation will determine the outcome of the 
national court’s ruling. Hence, the field of application of EU fundamental 
rights matter since it decides the ECJ’s power to review state acts. Put 
differently, ‘by deciding on the scope of EU fundamental rights, the ECJ is 
deciding on the scope of its own powers, and its capacity to influence upon 
state policies’.83 
 
In this connection, it should be emphasised that Article 6(1) TEU states that 
‘The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences 
of the Union as defined in the Treaties’.84 In the same vein Article 51(2) of 
the Charter declares that it does not establish any new powers for the Union 
or modify already established powers as defined in the Treaties. This over 
explicit emphasis on the limits to the EU’s powers is the result of some of 
                                                
81 Cartabia, Marta, ’General Provisions’ In: Mock, William B.T. & Demuro, Gianmario. 
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the Member States’ fear that the Charter could otherwise be used to extend 
the Union’s competence.85 
 
3.2.1 A Restriction of Previous Case Law? 
According to Article 51(1) of the Charter, the Member States must comply 
with the Charter rights ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. This 
formulation has caused a lot of debate among scholars since the literal 
meaning appears to entail a restriction of the pre-Lisbon case law, which 
used the ‘scope of EU law’ as the decisive formula.86  
 
However, the pre-Lisbon case law is not completely straightforward and the 
Court never spelled out the exact meaning of ‘the scope of EU law’. In 
practice, it seems to have entailed that the Court focused on finding any 
cross-border elements to establish a connection between the national 
measures in question and EU law.87 As a result, the situations that were 
considered to be ‘a wholly internal situation’ were viewed as falling outside 
the scope of EU law and thereby excluded the ECJ from having 
jurisdiction.88  
 
Different classifications of the situations where the Member States had to 
comply with EU fundamental rights pre-Lisbon appear in the academic 
literature. Even though the classifications vary to some extent, there seems 
to be consensus regarding the two main categories: when Member States 
acted as agents of EU law and when Member States derogated from EU 
law.89  
 
The first category has commonly been referred to as Wachauf-type cases 
and essentially concerned the situations when Member States were 
implementing EU law. The leading case, Wachauf, raised the question of the 
validity of the German authorities’ implementation of various Regulations 
on the system of milk quotas. The plaintiff argued at national level that the 
implementation infringed on his constitutional rights under national law.90 
With reference to Hauer, the ECJ restated that fundamental rights forms an 
integral part of the general principles of Community law and therefore must 
be ensured by the Court. Furthermore, the importance of constitutional 
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traditions common to the Member States was again emphasised.91 
Regarding the Member States’ obligations the Court concluded ‘since those 
requirements are also binding on the Member States when they implement 
Community rules, the Member States must, as far as possible, apply those 
rules in accordance with those requirements’.92  
 
The Court’s position in Wachauf was restated in Bostock; again the issue 
concerned the implementation of Community Regulations.93 In subsequent 
case law it was also established that the Member States had to comply with 
EU fundamental rights when implementing directives.94  
 
Both Wachauf and Bostock dealt with the scenario of Member States 
implementing EU law but the further development of the pre-Lisbon case 
law suggests that yet another type of situations can be discerned within the 
Wachauf line of cases; when Member States apply or interpret any 
provisions of national law that falls within the scope of EU law. The cases 
Rundfunk95 and Lindqvist96, which both concerned Directive 95/4697, 
illustrate this. Even though there were no apparent cross-boarder elements in 
these two cases the ECJ found that the national measures fell within the 
scope of EU law, in contrast to the Advocate General who in both cases 
argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to answer the questions from 
the national courts.98 Thus, Rundfunk and Lindqvist can both be said to 
illustrate a more extensive interpretation of the scope of EU law within the 
Wachauf-line of cases.  
 
However, an even more extensive interpretation of the scope of EU law is 
noticeable in the second category of cases: the ERT-type cases. In 1991, the 
Court clarified in ERT that the Member States also had to comply with EU 
fundamental rights when derogating from EU law.99 In contrast to the 
previous case Clinéthèque, which had indicated the opposite. 100 In ERT the 
issue in question was if the Greek state’s limitation of the freedom to 
provide services, based on clauses in the EC Treaty allowing derogation, 
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had to be compatible with fundamental rights. The ECJ again repeated that 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of Community law and expressed 
that the Community cannot accept measures by Member States that are not 
compatible with fundamental rights. As the Court continued it clarified that 
it would have jurisdiction to review national rules when they fall within the 
scope of Community law.101  
 
In subsequent case law, it was also clarified that the obligation to comply 
with EU fundamental rights did not only exist when Member States relied 
on derogation clauses in the Treaty but also when they relied on a public 
interest as recognized by the Court’s jurisprudence.102 In addition, it was 
established in Schmidberger that the protection of fundamental rights itself 
could be a legitimate reason for derogations from EU law. In this case, the 
right to free movement of goods had been limited with respect to the right to 
freedom of expression and assembly.103 
 
The ERT case was undoubtedly an extension of the Courts jurisdiction to 
review measures by the Member States compared with the Wachauf case.104 
This line of cases has also been contested because of the extension of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Some of the most controversial cases have involved EU 
citizens’ free movement rights, where the Court’s pre-Lisbon case law 
envisages a very extensive interpretation of the scope of EU law. It appears 
as if only the risk of obstructing or harming these rights have been enough 
for the Court to establish that the matter fell within the scope of EU law.105 
In this connection, Carpenter can be used as an illustrative example.  
 
Mrs Carpenter, a third country national was facing deportation from the 
United Kingdom after overstaying her leave and failing to apply for 
extension of her stay. She was married to a British national and argued that 
a deportation of her would infringe her husband’s freedom as a EU citizen 
to provide and receive services.106 The couple resided in the United 
Kingdom why it at first is difficult to imagine how there could be a 
connection between her deportation and her husbands right to EU free 
movements, but she claimed that he was only able to conduct his businesses 
because she was minding his children from a previous marriage.107 The 
Commission held that a EU citizen’s freedom to provide services was not 
concerned in this particular situation since it does not apply to ‘a national of 
a Member State that has never sought to establish himself with his spouse in 
another Member State but merely provides services from his State of 
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origin.’108 In other words, the Commission rejected the existence of any 
cross-boarder elements and considered it to be a wholly internal situation.  
 
In contrast, the Court accepted that there was a connection to Community 
law since a significant part of Mr Carpenter’s businesses, consisting of 
selling advertising space, were conducted with business partners in other 
Member States. Quite surprisingly, the Court also accepted that Mr 
Carpenter’s freedom to provide services could be adversely affected if he 
was to be separated from his spouse and she no longer could attend to his 
children.109 The Court then continued and recognized the Member State’s 
right to invoke public interest and restrict the fundamental freedoms 
established by the Treaty with the proviso that the measures must comply 
with fundamental rights. Finally, the Court considered that the measures 
taken by the United Kingdom was a disproportionate infringement on Mr 
Carpenters right to family life.110  
 
To sum up, the Wachauf-type cases essentially concerned the 
implementation of EU law while the ERT-type cases concerned derogations 
from EU law. It has therefore been argued that Article 51(1) of the Charter, 
stating that the Charter is binding on the Member States ‘only when they are 
implementing Union law’, could be interpreted as only addressing the 
Wachauf-type situations. However, this interpretation of Article 51(1) 
would exclude the ERT-type situations from its scope of application and 
entail a significant restriction of the Court’s previous case law.111 This 
would of course also mean that the ECJ’s power to review state measures, 
and influence upon state policies, would decrease significantly.  
 
3.2.2 The Meaning of ‘Implementing Union Law’ 
According to Paul Craig, there are four arguments to support the conclusion 
that the drafters of the Charter did not intend to diverge from the pre-Lisbon 
case law. First of all there is what Craig calls the ‘textual argument’. In the 
ECJ’s previous case law, the Court has used the wordings ‘implementing 
Community rules’ when referring to the scope of Community law. 
Furthermore, the ERT type cases are in a way also about the implementation 
of EU law since the possibility to derogate from EU law is provided for by 
EU law itself. 112   
 
Craig’s second argument is that the explanations relating to the Charter 
supports a broad interpretation.113 Notably, the explanations, which must be 
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given due consideration when interpreting the Charter according to Article 
6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, uses both the wordings ‘scope of 
Union law’ and ‘implementing Union law’ when addressing the Member 
States’ obligations. In this connection, there is also a reference to the ERT 
case. 114  
 
The third argument Craig presents is a normative argument. According to 
Craig there are no principle reasons for making a distinction between the 
Wachauf-type cases and the ERT-type cases, the protection of fundamental 
rights is equally important in both scenarios. Finally, the fourth argument is 
that a narrow interpretation would create an unsatisfactory situation since 
the ECJ’s pre-Lisbon case law would still be valid. This would entail that 
even though the ERT-type cases would not fall within the Charter’s scope of 
application it would still be possible to rely on fundamental rights as general 
principles when Member Sates’ derogate from EU law. Hence, there would 
be two parallel systems of review, which would only complicate matters.115 
 
Then again, what should the meaning of ‘implementing Union law’ be? 
According to Rosas, the meaning of ‘implementing Union law’ and the 
question of the Charter’s field of application should be focused on whether 
another EU norm is applicable or not. He highlights that the word 
‘implementing’ has not been used in all translated versions of the Charter. In 
fact, the Swedish translation, as an example, uses the verb ‘apply’ 
(tillämpa). He also highlights that the pre-Lisbon case law indicate that the 
ECJ has actually used this method. For example in Carpenter, the ECJ 
started out by considering whether the case before it involved the 
application of another EU norm before addressing the question of the 
Member States’ compliance with EU fundamental rights.116  
 
However, Rosas considers that a significant distinction must be made 
between cases where another EU norm is applicable in concreto and 
applicable in abstracto. An application of the Charter rights when another 
EU norm is only applicable in abstracto would entail that it was enough that 
EU law covered the issue before the Court, without having direct relevance 
for the litigation at hand. According to Rosas, this should be avoided 
because the Charter rights would otherwise be applicable in almost all 
situations since almost all areas are covered by EU law one-way or the 
other. In fact, Rosas considers that this distinction illustrates the difference 
between the more narrow formula ‘implementing Union law’ and the wider 
formula ‘the scope of EU law’.117 
 
Under section 4 of this thesis, I will return to the meaning of ‘implementing 
Union law’ as I examine the Court’s reasoning in Åkerberg.  
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3.3 National Constitutional Traditions 
Under section 2.1.2 of this thesis it was indicated that the ECJ in the cases 
Nold and Hauer became more prone towards using the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as an inspiration when interpreting 
EU fundamental rights. At the same time, the ECJ started to create a EU 
standard of protection somewhat other than the national standard of 
protection. 
 
Article 52(4) of the Charter states that: 
 
In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be 
interpreted in harmony with those traditions.118 
 
This entails that the ECJ has an interpretive obligation with respect to those 
rights that are originating from the Member States’ constitutions. This 
obligation does not require that there has to be ‘identity of result’, instead 
Article 52(4) imposes an obligation of harmonious interpretation. However, 
this is still a difficult task since the particular meaning of a right can vary 
considerably among the Member States.119 
 
In fact, it has been pointed out that the ECJ in its pre-Lisbon case law has 
more often made references to international human rights treaties than to 
national constitutional traditions. The reason for this is probably that the 
protection of human rights varies from Member State to Member State and 
that it is therefore difficult to establish what really is ‘common’. In contrast, 
international human rights treaties that have been ratified by all Member 
Sates can easier be said to envisage a commonality.120 
 
Weiler has also discussed the fact that human rights are not identical in all 
the European countries. Instead, they differ from society to society and 
reflect the values and choices of every single polity. Thus, they are part of 
the social identity and are therefore treasured by the people. Furthermore, 
the protection of human rights always entails striking a balance between 
competing interests. Just like human rights themselves are an expression of 
a society’s values, this balance, and how competing interests are balanced 
against each other, is an expression of societal choices. As a consequence, 
the question of which standards of protection are considered to be 
fundamental rights in the European legal order, and the balance between 
them, matters a great deal.121  
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As I see it, the ECJ is therefore always left with a difficult task since 
whatever standard the ECJ adopt, and however the balance is struck, the 
Court risks harming one of the Member State’s constitutional rights. Then, 
from a normative point of view, which standard should the ECJ adopt?  
 
The maximalist approach advocates that the ECJ should adopt the highest 
standard. Using Hauer as an example, this would have entailed that the 
Court had adopted the German standard, as it was higher than the 
Community standard which the Court did not. In fact, the ECJ has never 
accepted the maximalist approach. According to Weiler, there are good 
reasons for the Court’s reluctance as the maximalist approach would not be 
preferable; it would always favour one Member State at the expense of 
others. He illustrates this by using a hypothetical example; what if one 
Member State amended their constitution and introduced ‘fresh air’ as a 
constitutional right? If this right, being the highest standard, was adopted at 
EU level it would have to be respected by all Member States due to the 
principles of primacy and direct effect. Would this not be a great injustice 
for a country like Ireland, which is economically dependent on heavy 
industries? Instead, Weiler argues that the protection of fundamental rights 
at EU level should reflect all the Member States and their core values. 122 
 
Would it be better then to try to establish the lowest common denominator 
among the Member States? According to Tridimas, neither the maximalist 
approach nor the minimalistic approach, are appropriate solutions. Instead, 
the ECJ must establish a standard that is suitable with respect to the specific 
nature of the European legal order.123  
 
This is clearly also the view of Weiler, who uses Hauer as an example of 
how the Court has, in its pre-Lisbon case law, established that the European 
legal order cannot adept itself to all of the requirements at national level. In 
this connection, Weiler points to the Court’s statement:124 
 
The introduction of special criteria for assessment stemming from the 
legislation or constitutional law of a particular Member State would, by 
damaging the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, lead 
inevitably to the destruction of the unity of the Common Market and the 
jeopardizing of the Cohesion of the Community.125 
 
Weiler also highlights that even if the ECJ had adopted the higher German 
standard in Hauer, it would still have been a matter of applying this 
standard to the facts of the case and finding the “right” balance between 
different interests, the competing interest being the right to property and the 
public interest. Then again, if the balance between two competing interests 
itself differs among the Member States and represents different societal 
choices, which balance should be struck? In this respect, Weiler finds it 
naturally that the European legal order must find its own balance and that is 
                                                
122 Weiler, op. cit., pp. 58-61. 
123 Tridimas, op. cit., p. 312. 
124 Weiler, op. cit., pp. 58-60. 
125 Case 44/79 Hauer, para. 14. 
 37 
must be secured by the ECJ. In other words, it should be accepted that the 
ECJ is for the European legal order what the constitutional courts are for the 
national legal orders.126 
 
Even though Weiler apparently supports the autonomy of EU fundamental 
rights, he makes one significant distinction between the varying situations 
where Member States’ measures had to comply with fundamental rights. 
According to Weiler, it is natural that the Member States have to adjust 
themselves to a EU standard when acting as agents of EU law, even if that 
would entail that constitutional rights might be harmed. Regarding the ERT-
type situations, when Member States derogate from EU law, he instead 
considers that the national standard should be applied and that the ECJ 
should only interfere if the national standard is not in conformity with the 
ECHR. The reason for this distinction would be that when acting as agents, 
the Member States are implementing EU law, whereas when derogating 
from EU law they are implementing their own policies.127 Notably, as 
illustrated by Carpenter, this has not been the view of the Court.128 
 
With respect to Article 52(4) of the Charter, it is evident from the 
explanations relating to the Charter that the article is not intended to secure 
the lowest common denominator, but rather to offer a ‘high standard’ of 
protection.129 A fair conclusion also seems to be that this should not be 
interpreted as to mean that the ECJ should seek to secure the ‘highest 
standard’ of protection. But what then is a ‘high standard’ of protection and 
how can the ECJ interpret the Charter rights in harmony with national 
constitutional traditions when they in fact differ?  
 
In my view, the fact that constitutional rights are not identical in all Member 
States raises a question related to the tension between uniformity and 
diversity that was previously addressed under section 2.3.3; does the Charter 
rights have to be interpreted uniformly or should the ECJ defer to the 
interpretation of a fundamental right under national law in some cases? 
 
With regard to this question, one of the pre-Lisbon cases is particularly 
interesting, namely Omega Spielhallen.130 In this case, the German 
authorities had prohibited a German company, which had concluded a 
franchise agreement with a British company, to organize laserdrome games. 
The game was prohibited since it was considered to trivialize violence in a 
way that ran counter to the fundamental value of human dignity enshrined in 
the German Constitution. The affected company appealed the order and held 
that it infringed on their Community rights, in particular the free movement 
of goods and the freedom to provide services.131  
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The view of the relevant national court was that the national constitution 
could not allow a game that supported violence and denied the fundamental 
right of each person to be respected and acknowledged. Therefore, the 
national court stayed the proceeding and asked the ECJ if it would be 
allowed to prohibit certain elements of the game simply because it offended 
values enshrined in the constitution even though such a prohibition entailed 
a derogation from EU law.132  
 
The ECJ again stressed that fundamental rights are an integral part of 
Community law which observance the Court must ensure and that the Court, 
when ensuring fundamental rights, draws inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as well as international human 
rights treaties. The Court also highlighted that it strives to ensure that the 
principle of human dignity is protected, but that the right had a particular 
standing in the German Constitution as it had the status of an independent 
fundamental right.133 With reference to Schmidberger, the Court also held 
that the protection of fundamental rights could be a legitimate interest and 
ground for derogations. However, this would require that the measures by 
the Member State were proportionally which the Court considered 
Germany’s measures to be since only certain elements of the game were 
prohibited.134 Put simply, the Court recognized that human dignity had a 
special standing in the German Constitution and found that it was acceptable 
to allow an application of this higher standard. Additionally, with respect to 
the balancing of interest, Germany’s measures were found to be 
proportionate.  
 
Notably, the Omega Spielhallen case shows that the ECJ has accepted to 
allow a certain degree of diversity. According to Xavier Groussot, Article 
52(4) could actually have a similar function. To begin with, he considers 
that Article 52 (4) is an extension of Article 4(2) TEU, which states that EU 
must respect the Member States’ constitutional identities. Furthermore he 
argues that Article 52(4) actually reflects constitutional pluralism. Given 
this interpretation, Article 52(4) could be used by the Court in situations 
similar to Omega Spielhallen to reconcile a strong national constitutional 
principle with a conflicting Charter right. Thus, the article could be the 
vehicle for ensuring that the European legal order and the national legal 
orders can co-exist in a peaceful manner.135  
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3.4 The Level of Protection 
As already stated previously in this thesis, the protection of human rights in 
Europe can be said to exist in three different spheres, at international, at 
supranational and at national level. Article 53 of the Charter declares that: 
 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.136 
It therefore seems like Article 53 of the Charter aims at managing 
potential conflicts of rights and to ensure that the Charter will not 
undermine the already existing protection of human rights.137 
Regarding the Charter’s relation to the ECHR the meaning of Article 53 
appears to be that the Charter must provide, at the minimum, the same level 
of protection as the ECHR secures. This assumption is strengthened by the 
fact that the potential risk of harming the level of protection provided for by 
the ECHR was a great concern of the Council of Europe and during the 
drafting of the Charter it indicated on several occasions that the Charter 
would not be accepted if it adversely affected the ECHR.138  
 
With regard to the relationship between the Charter and the Member States’ 
constitutions, the “correct” interpretation of Article 53 is far from self-
evident. To begin with, it has been raised that the phrase ‘in their respective 
fields of applications’ contributes with some ambiguity. This phrase 
indicates that the Charter rights, the rights in international agreements, and 
the constitutional rights, actually have separate fields of applications and 
that the Charter will not interfere within the other fields. However, it could 
well be argued that Article 53 itself shows that there is actually an overlap 
and potential for conflict between EU fundamental rights and other rights, 
why else would there be a need to insert this article?139  
 
Secondly, Article 53 could be understood as restricting the Charter rights 
from undermining the level of protection offered by the Member States 
constitutions. Thus, it could open up for the argument that within the field of 
application of EU law, the Charter rights is not allowed to adversely affect 
the protection of constitutional rights. This broad interpretation of Article 53 
could obviously have the effect of undermining the principle of supremacy 
if it would justify that national courts apply their own constitutional rights 
instead of the Charter rights simply because the national rights provide a 
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higher level of protection.140 Hence, this interpretation would alter the 
relationship between EU law and national law significantly.  
 
According to Torres, there is an alternative way of interpreting Article 53, 
which goes well in line with her theory that was discussed under section 
2.3.3. Torres argues that Article 53 could instead be used by the Court to 
defer to the interpretation of a fundamental right under national law. 
However, this would only be possible in those situations when the level of 
protection is higher under national law and the application of a higher level 
of protection does not harm other rights or interests. This interpretation 
would therefore entail that Article 53 constraint the application of the 
Charter rights without threatening the principle of supremacy.141  
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4 The Charter; Altering the 
Relationship Between EU 
Law and National Law? 
4.1 Recent Case Law 
In February 2013, the ECJ finally delivered its rulings in Åkerberg and 
Melloni. Even though it at first might seem as these two cases deal with 
completely different issues, they are in fact closely connected and must be 
read in conjunction. In the following, I will therefore describe the cases and 
the issues concerned separately, before I start analysing the Court’s 
reasoning under the next section of this thesis.  
 
4.1.1 Åkerberg 
The Åkerberg case was referred to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU from a 
Swedish court, Haparanda Tingsrätt, and concerned the Swedish system of 
financial- and criminal penalties and its compliance with the ne bis in idem 
principle. In 2007, the Swedish tax authority (Skatteverket) had obligated 
Mr Åkerberg to pay a financial penalty since he had provided Skatteverket 
with false information about his economic activity in his tax returns for 
2004 and 2005. Due to the false information, Mr Åkerberg had withheld a 
significant amount of money, part of it being value added tax (VAT), from 
the national exchequer. In 2009, Mr Åkerberg was summoned to appear 
before Haparanda Tingsrätt, facing criminal charges of serious tax offences. 
Just like the financial penalty, the criminal charges were based on the fact 
that Åkerberg had provided false information in his tax returns for 2004 and 
2005.142 
 
The question then arose before Haparanda Tingsrätt whether Mr Åkerberg 
could be penalised a second time for the same conduct or if the charges 
should be dismissed because of the prohibition on being punished twice for 
the same actions enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR and 
Article 50 of the Charter. In this connection, Haparanda Tingsrätt decided to 
stay the proceedings and referred a number of questions to the ECJ. The 
questions all aimed at clarifying the national legislation’s compliance with 
the principle ne bis in idem and the Member States’ obligations under EU 
law. However, the Commission and several Member States, one of them 
being Sweden, objected and held that the subject-matter did not fall within 
the Court’s jurisdiction since the circumstances of the case did not concern 
the implementation of Union law. Therefore, it was argued that according to 
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Article 51(1) of the Charter, the Member State’s measures should not be 
reviewed in light of the Charter.143  
 
Evidently, the Åkerberg case raised the question of how to interpret Article 
51 of the Charter, and entailed a possibility to receive some clarifications 
from the Court regarding the scope of EU law in the post-Lisbon context. I 
will shortly return to this question and the Court’s reasoning, but first 
something must be said about the Melloni case.  
 
4.1.2 Melloni 
As I have already highlighted in this thesis, there is potential for a conflict 
between constitutional rights and the Charter rights. What standard should 
be applied and must EU law always be given precedence over national law 
due to the principle of supremacy?  
 
Within one particular area, the potential for a conflict between constitutional 
rights and the Charter seems to be very evident: the area of freedom, justice 
and security (AFSJ), which includes policies on immigration and criminal 
law. The Melloni case illustrates this as it raised the question of European 
Arrest Warrants (EAW) and the application of constitutional rights.  
 
The Melloni case concerned an Italian citizen, Mr Melloni, who was 
arrested in Spain in 1996 and for whom Italy had issued an EAW in 1993. 
Because of the EAW, a Spanish court decided that Mr Melloni was going to 
be extradited to Italy. However, after being released on bail, Mr Melloni 
fled and could therefore not be surrendered to the Italian authorities. Even 
so, the proceeding against Mr Melloni continued in Italy and since he had 
not made appearance in court it was decided that further notice was to be 
given to his appointed lawyers. Subsequently, the Italian courts sentenced 
Mr Melloni in absentia, that is without him being present, to ten years 
imprisonment for bankruptcy fraud. Mr Melloni’s lawyers appealed the 
sentence without any success and the Italian authorities issued an EAW for 
execution of the sentence.144 
 
In 2008, Mr Melloni again was arrested in Spain. This time around, Mr 
Melloni held before the Spanish court that he should not be extradited to 
Italy since it would be impossible for him under Italian law to appeal against 
the sentence imposed in absentia. In the end, Mr Melloni made a petition for 
constitutional protection to the Spanish Constitutional Court, claiming that 
an extradition to Italy, without the condition that he could appeal against the 
sentence in Italy, would violate his constitutional rights to a fair trial. In 
addition, Mr Melloni held that his right to human dignity would also be 
undermined.145 
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The Spanish Constitutional Court found that the extradition of a person from 
Spain to another country, which does not guarantee that the convicted party 
will be able to appeal a sentence imposed in absentia, would actually violate 
the Spanish constitutional right to a fair trial. Therefore, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court stayed the proceedings and asked the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling.146  
Three questions were referred to the ECJ. First of all, the relevant national 
court asked whether Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision 2002/584147 
must be understood as precluding national authorities from making the 
execution of an EAW ‘conditional upon the conviction rendered in absentia 
being open to review in the issuing Member State’.148 The ECJ answered 
this question in the affirmative. The Court held, as it done previously in the 
Radu149 case, that the execution of an EAW can only be refused on the 
grounds specified in article 3, 4 and 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584. 
Article 4a(1) addresses the possibility to deny execution when the 
conviction was rendered in absentia. This provision further specifies that an 
EAW must be executed if the convicted person was aware of the scheduled 
trial and informed of the consequences of not making appearance in court, 
or if the convicted person gave a mandate to a legal counsellor to defend 
him. Furthermore, the ECJ emphasised that the framework decision was 
intended to harmonise the grounds for non-recognition of other Member 
States’ judicial decisions.150 
 
Secondly, the relevant national court asked whether Article 4a(1) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584 is in compliance with Article 47 of the 
Charter, protecting the right to an effective judicial remedy and the right to a 
fair trial, and Article 48 of the Charter, protecting the right of defence. With 
regard to the second question, the ECJ held that the Charter right to a fair 
trial is not absolute and that it can be waived either expressly or tacitly. 
Furthermore, this interpretation of article 47 and article 48 of the Charter is 
in accordance with the ECHR. Therefore, said provision of the framework 
decision was found to be in compliance with the rights of the Charter.151 
 
Lastly, the Spanish Constitutional Court asked whether Article 53 of the 
Charter allows the Member States to make the execution of an EAW for a 
person who was sentenced in absentia conditional upon the conviction 
being open to review in the issuing Member State if a constitutional right 
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would otherwise be adversely affected.152 In other words, the third question 
was directly aimed at the question of whether Article 53 allows Member 
States to apply constitutional rights when they provide a higher level of 
protection, even though it is contrary to the principle of supremacy. The 
Court’s answer to this question, and the reasoning in Åkerberg, will be 
addressed in the next section of this thesis as I turn to the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 51 and Article 53 of the Charter.  
 
4.2 A New Test Emerging 
As previous parts of this thesis has shown the decisive test for deciding the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights was pre-Lisbon that the 
national measures fell within the ‘scope of EU law’. I have also addressed 
the academic debate suggesting that Article 51(1) of the Charter could be 
interpreted as a restriction of this previous test, as it instead refers to ‘only 
when they are implementing Union law’. Notably, a restriction would 
implicate that EU law would not influence and govern the protection of 
human rights at national level to the same extent. In Åkerberg, the Court 
finally made some much-welcomed clarifications.  
 
Firstly, it should be highlighted that two cases previous to Åkerberg 
indicated that Article 51(1) should not be interpreted as excluding the ERT-
type situations from the Charter’s field of application. To begin with, the 
case N.S concerned Regulation No 343/2003153 (the Dublin Regulation), 
regulating which Member State has the responsibility to examine an asylum 
application by a third country national.154 The question arose whether the 
relevant Member State had ‘implemented Union law’ when using its 
discretionary powers provided for by said Regulation. According to Article 
3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, a Member State can chose to assume the 
responsibility to examine an asylum application even though the Regulation 
assigns this task to another Member State. The Court did not elaborate on 
the correct interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, but rather concluded 
that the discretionary powers given to the Member States is simply part of 
the greater Common European Asylum System. Therefore, while using its 
discretionary powers, the Member State was in fact implementing Union 
law.155 According to Rosas, this case thereby confirmed that ERT-type 
situations would not be excluded form the Charter’s field of application.156   
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The second case, which supported this view, was Dereci and Others157. The 
case concerned five third-country nationals who had been rejected residence 
in Austria. In addition, expulsion orders and individual removing orders had 
been issued for four of the applicants. Some of them had entered the country 
legally and others had entered it illegally. Still, the applicants all had one 
thing in common; they had family members residing in Austria, whom were 
Austrian citizens and thus EU citizens. The applicants argued that their 
family members’ right to reside would be infringed if they were to be 
rejected residence and expelled from Austria. However, none of the 
applicants’ family members had exercised their right to free movement why 
there were no evident cross-boarder elements that could trigger the 
application of EU law.158 At first, it might seem far-fetched to argue that the 
case entailed a restriction of EU citizens’ rights, but not in light of the ECJ’s 
previous case law. In Ruiz Zambrano the Court held that the removing of a 
third-country national would infringe on his child’s right to reside under 
Article 20(1) TFEU as the child was a EU citizen and economically 
dependent on the father. The effect of removing the father would therefore 
be that the child also had to leave the Union and the child would thereby be 
deprived of its right to reside.159 However, in Dereci and Other, the 
applicants’ family members were not economically dependent on the 
applicants.160  
 
To begin with, the Court held in Dereci and Others that Directive 
2003/86161 and 2004/38162 were not applicable since the family members 
had always resided in Austria. With regard to the Courts ruling in Ruiz 
Zambrano, the question then arose whether Article 20(1) TFEU could be 
applicable despite the fact that the right had never been exercised. In this 
connection, the Court stated that Article 20 TFEU precludes national 
measures, which have the effect of depriving EU citizens the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the right to reside in Article 20(1). The Court 
also expressed that the denial of the substance of the rights to reside should 
be understood as situations where the EU citizen in effect is forced to leave 
not only the Member State but also the Union as a whole.163  
 
The Court never spelled out whether the situations in the given case before 
them would be considered as an infringement on the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the right to reside or not, in other words if it should be 
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viewed as a derogation from the Treaty. This was instead left to the national 
court to decide. However, the Court continued and elaborated on if another 
EU norm, such as the right to family life in Article 7 of the Charter, could 
invoke a right for the applicants to reside. With regard to this question, the 
Court emphasised that according to Article 51 of the Charter it is only 
applicable when Member States are implementing Union law and that the 
Charter does not extend the Union’s powers. With that said, the Court held 
that it was for the national court to decide whether the circumstances of the 
applicants situations should be considered as covered by EU law or not. 
Importantly, the Court also stated that if EU law covered the situation, the 
Member State had to make sure to respect the right to family life in Article 7 
of the Charter.164  
 
Even though these two cases indicated that the Member States would still 
have to comply with EU fundamental rights when derogating from EU law, 
it was still not clear how to interpret Article 51 of the Charter since the 
Court in neither N.S. nor Dereci and Others made any clear statements 
about it. 
 
In Åkerberg, the Advocate General Cruz Villalón addressed the question of 
the Court’s jurisdiction and acknowledged the need for clarifications. The 
Advocate General emphasised that the explanations relating to the Charter 
points to continuity with the Court’s previous case law rather than a 
restriction, something he agreed to with some modifications.165 According 
to Advocate General Cruz Villalón, despite the different wordings used to 
describe the situations entailing an obligation for the Member States to 
comply with EU fundamental rights, there has been a common requirement; 
‘Union law must have a presence at the origin of the exercise of public 
authority’. In other words, a law with the ability to either determine or 
influence the Member States’ public authority.166 Mr Cruz Villalón also 
highlighted that there is a relationship of a rule and an exception. The rule is 
that the Member States themselves have the competence to review acts of 
their public authority and its compliance with their own constitutions and 
international treaties, while the exception is when the Member States have 
transferred this responsibility to the Union.167 
 
In light of these observations, Advocate General Cruz Villalón concluded 
that just the mere presence of Union law at the origin of the exercise of the 
public authority should not be enough for the Union to have the competence 
to assume responsibility to review Member States’ measures, instead it 
should require a specific interest of the Union.168 In my view, the Advocate 
General thereby clearly argued that the ECJ should adopt a new test for 
deciding the Member States’ obligations to comply with EU fundamental 
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rights. Even though he did not make a distinction between the Wachauf-type 
situations and the ERT-type situations, his reasoning would in fact imply a 
significant restriction of previous case law by introducing a requirement of 
an interest of the Union.  
 
With respect to the circumstances of the specific case, Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón finally suggested that the Court did not have jurisdiction. To 
begin with, the Advocate General did not consider there to be a sufficiently 
strong connection between the Union law and the exercise of public 
authority to clearly establish a specific interest for the Union that would 
allow the Union to assume responsibility for a review. In this connection, he 
highlighted that the only EU legislation that provides a requirement for the 
effectiveness of collection of VAT is Directive 2006/112 on the common 
system of value added tax169. However, the relevant national provisions on 
false information in Åkerberg are not a direct implementation of said 
provisions but simply a part of the general tax system. Having concluded 
that, the Advocate General asked whether this situation, where national 
legislation is simply securing the objectives established in Union law, 
should be comparable to the situation when the national legislation is 
directly based on Union law. In the specific case of Åkerberg, the Advocate 
General considered that the problems that might arise from the interpretation 
and scope of the ne bis in idem principle in Swedish law is not directly 
connected to the collection of VAT but is rather a general problem for that 
legal system. As he put it, it is a matter of occasio and not causa why it 
would be disproportionate for the Union to assume competence for a 
review.170 Even though the Advocate General did not put it into the same 
words as Rosas, it seems to me as if his reasoning is in line with Rosas’ 
view that there should be a distinction made between when another EU 
norm is applicable in concreto and applicable in abstracto.  
 
However, the Court did not agree with Advocate General Cruz Villalón. To 
begin with, the Court held that Article 51 of the Charter confirms the 
Court’s previous case law. Just like previous case law have shown, the 
Member States have an obligation to comply with fundamental rights when 
acting within the scope of EU law.  In addition, the Court agreed with the 
Advocate General as it held that this is evident from the explanations 
relating to the Charter.171  Thus, in the words of the Court: ‘The 
applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Charter’.172 Thereby, the Court clarified once and 
for all that Article 51 of the Charter does not exclude ERT-type situations. 
In my view, this should be welcomed if not only for the reason, which Craig 
has highlighted, that there could otherwise be two parallel systems of 
review. Something that would complicate matters significantly. 
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The Court also emphasised that it has no jurisdiction outside the scope of 
EU law since the provisions of the Charter, on their own, cannot be relied 
upon to create a basis for jurisdiction. In this connection, the Court referred 
to Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51(2) of the Charter.173 This is hardly 
surprising since the opposite would entail a significant shift of powers from 
the Member States to the EU. 
 
The Court then answered whether the situation in Åkerberg was within the 
scope of EU law or not and started by concluding that the matter was partly 
connected to the collection of VAT and Directive 2006/112. It also 
highlighted that Article 4(3) of said Directive defines that the Member 
States ‘have an obligation to take all legislative measures appropriate for 
ensuring collection of all VAT due in its territory and for preventing 
evasion’. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court also found another 
provision of EU law to be involved, Article 325 TFEU, placing an 
obligation on the Member States to effectively prevent illegal activities 
affecting the financial interest of the Union. The Court held that if the 
Member States failed to collect VAT it would in the end harm the financial 
interests of the Union. These conclusions led the Court to decide that the 
situation in Åkerberg was in fact within the scope of EU law, despite the 
fact that the national legislation was not adopted to transpose Directive 
2006/112.174  
 
To sum up, the Court confirmed that the ERT-type situations are not 
excluded from the Charter rights field of application. The Åkerberg case 
also envisages a rather extensive interpretation of the scope of EU law since 
the national legislation in question was not adopted to directly implement 
Union law. It was therefore a situation similar to the second category of 
cases that could be detectible within the Wachauf-line of cases: when 
Member States apply or interpret any national provisions that fall within the 
scope of EU law. However, after deciding that the Åkerberg case fell within 
the scope of EU law, the Court continued and stated that:  
 
That said, where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether 
fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure 
which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely 
determined by European Union law, implements the latter for the purpose of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to 
apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and 
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby 
compromised (see, in relation to the latter aspect, Case C-399/11 Melloni 
[2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 60).175 
 
What is the Court saying with this statement? In order to analyse this part of 
the ruling, I find it necessary to first return to Melloni and the third question 
                                                
173 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg, paras. 22-23. 
174 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg, paras. 24-28. 
175 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg, para 29, (Italic by the authour) 
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referred from the national court to the ECJ. Just as a reminder, the third 
question concerned the interpretation of Article 53; could it entail that 
Member States are free to apply the national standards, in other words 
constitutional rights, when it provides a higher level of protection than the 
Charter? 
 
In Melloni, the Court rejected this interpretation of Article 53 as it would be 
contrary to the principle of primacy and enable the Member States to 
disapply provisions of EU law that are in compliance with the Charter. In 
this connection, the Court referred to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
and emphasised that it is settled case law that not even the Member States’ 
constitutions can be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law.176 
Thereby, the Court settled the speculations regarding Article 53 and whether 
it could mean that national courts are free to apply constitutional rights in all 
situations where the national standard provides a higher level of protection. 
Then what is the meaning of Article 53? The Court held in Melloni that: 
 
It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act 
calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, 
provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted 
by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
thereby compromised.177 
 
 
With respect to the situation in Melloni, the Court found that the framework 
decision in question represented a fully regulated area of EU law, intended 
to harmonise the conditions of execution of EAW and built on the principle 
of mutual recognition. Therefore, the Member States must apply the 
standard of protection provided for by the Charter to not compromise the 
efficacy of EU law.178 
 
The quotation above is actually the one referred to by the Court in the 
previous quotation from Åkerberg. Reading these two quotations in 
conjunction, what do they signify? 
 
As I see it, it provides a new test for deciding the field of application of EU 
fundamental rights. Notably, the wordings ‘implementing Union law’ in 
Article 51 of the Charter has the same meaning as the ‘scope of EU law’ did 
pre-Lisbon. However, as I interpret the quotations above, the Court held that 
Article 53 entails that the national courts can apply the national standard of 
protection instead of the Charter rights when they are reviewing measures 
by the Member States, which falls within the meaning of ‘implementing 
Union law’, and if EU law does not entirely determine how it should be 
implemented. Although they still have to respect the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and efficacy of EU law. 
In contrast, the Member States have to apply the Charter rights in situations 
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like Melloni where it is already determined by EU law which measures that 
must be taken. In a way, the Member States’ margin of discretion will 
therefore be determining their obligations.  
 
In my view, this also entails that the Court actually used Article 53 of the 
Charter as the basis for determining the Charter rights’ field of application. 
However, it is also my view that this interpretation of Article 53 is 
somewhat confusing with respect to the fact that Article 51 of the Charter 
has the headline ‘field of application’ while Article 53 has the headline 
‘level of protection’. In addition, it could well be argued that if some other 
article than Article 51 should be used to determining the Charter rights’ field 
of application, Article 52(4) would be a better choice since it is one of the 
articles that are placed under the headline ‘scope and interpretation of rights 
and principles’.  
 
Nevertheless, the Court’s interpretation in Åkerberg and Melloni seems 
important since it actually allows the national courts to rely on the national 
standard of protection in some situations. Furthermore, it could well be 
argued that the national courts are also given a more significant part to play. 
In the next section I will therefore discuss whether Åkerberg and Melloni 
could actually be seen as a reflection of constitutional pluralism.  
 
4.3  A Reflection of Constitutional 
Pluralism? 
Under this section I will examine whether the cases Åkerberg and Melloni 
could actually be seen as reflections of constitutional pluralism. In this part I 
will continue to rely on discursive constitutional pluralism and the theories 
of Maduro and Torres. As previous parts of this thesis have shown, they 
both focused on the co-operation between the ECJ and the national courts 
and the potential for a shared discourse between the courts since they 
consider it to be a way of legitimising the ECJ’s authority. According to 
Torres, it is also important that the national courts get a more significant 
part to play for the interpretation of EU fundamental rights. In addition, they 
have both dealt with the underlying tension between uniformity and 
diversity.  
 
The pre-Lisbon case law shows that the ECJ has consistently upheld the 
principle of primacy and denied that constitutional rights could be used to 
review EU legal acts or measures by the Member States that falls within the 
scope of EU law. One of the main reasons supporting this view is that it has 
been held that the unity and efficacy of EU law could otherwise be 
adversely affected. In other words, that the European integration would be 
harmed. Instead, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
have been used as a mere influence and guideline when interpreting EU 
fundamental rights. Thereby, the Court has safeguarded the autonomy of the 
EU legal order and made clear that the protection of fundamental rights in 
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EU law must be adapted to the specific nature of the EU legal order. In 
addition, it has positioned itself as the final arbitrator. Is there really 
something in the cases Åkerberg and Melloni that shows a different 
approach?  
 
First of all, after the Court had clarified in the Åkerberg case that national 
courts are under certain circumstances allowed to apply national standards 
of protection of fundamental rights, it continued and emphasised that when 
it is necessary for the national courts to interpret the Charter they may in 
some cases, and must in some cases, make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling. As a consequence, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to 
answer the questions referred from the relevant Swedish court.179 In other 
words, even though the situation in Åkerberg was not entirely determined by 
EU law the Court assumed jurisdiction to answer the referred questions and 
to interpret the content of the Charter right in question. The reason for this is 
probably that even though the national courts are free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights they still have to respect the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the ECJ is still claiming the authority to interpret EU 
fundamental rights, even when the connection to EU law is quite weak, and 
the national courts must take the ECJ’s interpretation into consideration 
when deciding on the case. Furthermore, the national courts therefore 
always must make a reference to the ECJ when it is not clear how to 
interpret the Charter.  
 
From this section of the Åkerberg case it could well be argued that the ECJ 
has not changed its position at all. In addition, the obligations of the national 
courts were further highlighted as the Court answered the first question 
referred to it from Haparanda Tingsrätt, which aimed at clarifying if the 
Swedish courts’ judicial practice was compatible with EU law. As already 
highlighted previously in this thesis, the Simmenthal case established that 
national courts have an obligation to disapply national legislation when it is 
contrary to EU law. In contrast, the Swedish courts’ judicial practice had 
made that obligation, with regard to rights protected by the ECHR and the 
Charter, conditional upon the infringements being clear from the text of 
these instruments or relevant case law. The ECJ considered this practice to 
be contrary to EU law and held that the national courts must ensure that 
national legislation does not hinder EU law from having full force and effect 
at national level.180  
 
In this connection, the Court also reminded that the national courts are 
obligated under certain circumstances to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling when hearing a case that involves EU law and when the meaning or 
scope of EU law is not clear.181 This remainder was probably directly aimed 
to the Swedish courts since the Swedish High Court, in 2011, refrained from 
making a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case quite similar to the 
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Åkerberg case. The majority considered the question to be outside the scope 
of EU law, while two judges revealed in their dissenting opinion that they 
considered it to be within the scope.182 In fact, it could easily be argued that 
the Swedish High Court should have considered it necessary to make a 
reference since the opinion of the two dissenting judges indicates that it was 
not a clear-cut case at all. Consequently, the Court’s reasoning in Åkerberg 
also entails that the ECJ is claiming the authority to decide whether the 
measures taken by the Member State are to be considered as ‘implementing 
Union law’ or not.  
 
Importantly, the Court concluded in the following that: 
 
It follows that European Union law precludes a judicial practice which makes 
the obligation for a national court to disapply any provisions contrary to a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter conditional upon that infringement 
being clear from the text of the Charter or the case-law relating to it since it 
withholds from the national court the power to asses fully, with, as the case 
may be, the cooperation of the Court of Justice, whether that provision is 
compatible with the Charter.183 
 
In my view, it is significant that the Court used the word co-operation. First 
of all, it could be interpreted as a response to the previously mentioned 
Maastricht decision, by which the FCC held that it exercises its jurisdiction 
in co-operation with the ECJ. Secondly, this part of the Åkerberg case could 
also be seen as not only a testimony to how the ECJ defines the national 
courts’ obligations, but also to how it defines the very nature of the 
relationship between the national courts and the ECJ; there must be a co-
operation and Article 267 TFEU is the vehicle.  
 
The FCC actually responded to the ECJ’s statement in April 2013. In a case 
concerning the German counter-terrorism database act and its compliance 
with the German Constitution, the FCC held that it did not have to make a 
reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. In this connection, the FCC 
emphasised that the act did not constitute implementation of Union law 
according to Article 51(1) of the Charter184. It also held that the Åkerberg 
case did not change this conclusion and stated that: 
 
As part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read in a way 
that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the 
protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a 
way that questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order. The 
senate acts on the assumption that the statements in the ECJ’s decision are 
based on the distinctive features of the law on value-added tax and express no 
general view.185  
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As I see it, this could be interpreted as a warning from the FCC to the ECJ 
that it will not accept the interpretation of ‘implementing Union law’ to be 
so extensive that it could include all situations that are remotely related to 
EU law. It also shows that in a way there is some sort of dialogue between 
the ECJ and the national courts, at least between the ECJ and the FCC. The 
two courts are using the same language and are to some extent also trying to 
adjust themselves to the claims of the other, but also setting limits to the 
other courts jurisdiction. 
 
To sum up my discussion so far, I consider that the Court’s reasoning in 
Åkerberg shows that the ECJ acknowledge that there must be a co-operation 
between the ECJ and the national courts for the protection of fundamental 
rights. I would also like to argue that this is actually a reflection of 
discursive constitutional pluralism.  
 
However, it is not clear to what extent the ECJ will actually engage in a 
dialogue with the national courts on the interpretation of the Charter rights. 
It seems as if the ECJ is still claiming to be the final arbitrator of how to 
interpret these rights. Even so, the fact that national courts are free to apply 
national standards of the protection of fundamental rights under certain 
circumstances, where the ECJ contributes by interpreting the Charter rights, 
seems to signal that the national courts and the national interpretation of 
fundamental rights are given a more significant part to play. Furthermore, 
the application of national standards might also render in a judicial practice 
that is more allowing of minor differences in the protection of human rights 
among the Member States since there might be a slight difference between 
‘not compromising the level of protection provided for by the Charter and 
the primacy, unity and efficacy of EU law’ and applying EU fundamental 
rights directly. As I see it, this is a new nuance and has the potential to open 
up for some interesting cases.  
 
In this connection, I would again like to address the underlying tension 
between uniformity and diversity that has been discussed previously in this 
thesis. As I interpret Torres, her theory essential seeks a way of reconciling 
the differences in protection of fundamental rights in the European legal 
order and the national legal orders. According to Torres, this should be 
achieved through an on-going dialogue between the ECJ and the national 
courts. She has also highlighted that a certain degree of diversity must be 
allowed. In this connection, Torres has suggested that Article 53 could be 
interpreted as allowing deference to the interpretation of a fundamental right 
under national law when the national standard provides a higher level of 
protection and no other rights and interests would be harmed. The Court’s 
interpretation of Article 53 has some clear similarities with this suggestion 
since the national courts are free to apply the national standard in situations 
where the Member States have been given a margin of discretion. In 
addition, it would only be allowed when the national standard provides a 
higher level of protection than the Charter since it is not allowed if it 
undermines the level of protection provided for by the Charter. Lastly, it 
would only be allowed when it does not undermine the primacy, unity and 
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efficacy of EU law, which could be understood as other interests. As I have 
already mentioned above, I also believe that this interpretation of Article 53, 
could open up for allowing minor differences.  
 
Therefore, the Court’s statement in Åkerberg and Melloni could once again 
be understood as a reflection of constitutional pluralism since it in a way 
acknowledges that EU law does not always have to prevail in every single 
situation. Instead, a common standard must be respected in order for EU law 
to be efficient and to promote the European integration, but beyond that the 
Member States can apply a higher standard of protection. The Court’s 
interpretation therefore has the potential to reconcile the European legal 
order with the national legal orders, instead of claiming that the Charter 
rights or the constitutional rights are inherently superior to the other.  
 
It could well be argued that this function could instead have been given to 
Article 52(4) and that it in one way would have been more logical since said 
article can be viewed as an extension of Article 4(2) TEU, which states that 
the EU must respect the Member States’ constitutional identities. However, 
in my view, the two articles have the potential to assign similar functions to 
the ECJ and to the national courts. The result of the ECJ’s interpretation of 
Article 53 of the Charter is not only that it is allowing the national courts to 
apply the national standard of protection in some situations, but also 
obligates them to respect the Charter rights and the fundamental principles 
of EU law. As a consequence, the national courts must interpret the national 
standard in harmony with EU law. In a similar vein, Article 52(4) states that 
the ECJ, when interpreting the Charter rights, must interpret them in 
harmony with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
As I see it, it is a fair conclusion that both articles can have the effect of 
reconciling the protection of human rights at supranational level and at 
national level. The difference between the articles is that the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 53 places the obligation of harmonious 
interpretation on the national courts while Article 52(4) places this 
obligation on the ECJ. Again, this envisages that the ECJ and the national 
courts have equally important functions for the European integration and 
that there must be a co-operation. 
 
To sum up, I do believe that the Court’s reasoning in Åkerberg and Melloni 
could be seen as a reflection of discursive constitutional pluralism. First of 
all, the Court’s language in Åkerberg shows that it acknowledges that it is 
practicing its jurisdiction to review measures by the Member States in co-
operation with the national courts. Secondly, even though the Court did not 
give the wordings ‘implementing Union law’ a narrower interpretation, its 
interpretation of Article 53 shows that the national courts and the 
constitutional rights are given a more significant part to play. At the end of 
the day, this might have the effect of creating harmony between the 
European legal order and the national legal orders.  
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5 Final Conclusions  
In this final section of the thesis I will return to the questioned that I posed 
at the beginning; what are the implications of the Charter for the 
relationship between EU law and national? 
 
As I have shown in this thesis, the actual meaning of the horizontal 
provisions of the Charter has been discussed in the academic literature and 
the discussions started long before the Charter became legally binding. Both 
Åkerberg and Melloni are thus important cases since they contribute with 
some actual answers to some of these questions.  
 
To begin with, it has been raised that Article 51(1) of the Charter could 
imply a narrower interpretation of the scope of EU law and exclude ERT-
type situations from its field of application. It is, however, evident from the 
Court’s reasoning in Åkerberg that this is not the case. Even so, the Court 
restricted the Charter rights field of application through its interpretation of 
Article 53; although the Member States must at all times comply with the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter at a minimum when they are 
‘implementing Union law’. This interpretation of Article 53 also settles the 
speculations regarding weather it could ultimately threaten the supremacy of 
EU law. Instead, I would like to argue that the Court’s interpretation reflects 
constitutional pluralism. This also strengthens the idea that when examining 
the relationship between the European legal order and national legal orders 
we should not search for a ‘grundnorm’, to put it into Kelsen’s terms, but 
instead focus on how the different legal systems interact and influence each 
other.  
 
As I have pointed out, the ECJ is still claiming the authority to interpret the 
rights of the Charter and the wide interpretation of ‘implementing Union 
law’ also implies that the Court will continue to influence upon state 
policies to a great extent. Even so, the Court’s reasoning in Åkerberg also 
envisages that the Court acknowledges that it is practicing its jurisdiction in 
co-operation with the national courts. Yet, the FCC’s response in April 2013 
can be interpreted as a warning to the ECJ that it will not be enough to 
simply claim that there is a co-operation. As a part of the co-operation, the 
ECJ cannot extend its jurisdiction to infinity. Nevertheless, it can also be 
interpreted as that there is actually some kind of dialogue between the 
courts, at least between the ECJ and the FCC. In this thesis I have only 
focused on the FCC because of the fact that it has previously voiced its 
position in a number of cases. Though, it would be interesting to examine 
more closely the role of the national courts in other Member States, and 
probably necessary, to get a better understanding of the potential for a 
dialogue between the courts.  
 
Then, if Åkerberg and Melloni could be viewed as a reflection of 
constitutional pluralism, does it mean that the Court’s interpretation 
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significantly alters the relationship between EU law and national law? I am 
inclined to answer this question in the negative. The reason for this is that it 
could well be argued that it does not alter something; it only confirms what 
was already true.  
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